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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE LAW AND
POLITICS OF REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY
CALVIN MASSE'V*
Abstract: This Article examihes several legal and political issues raised by
reparations for slavery and offers a skeptical appraisal of both the wisdoln of
reparations and their potential for success. There are a number of legal ob-
stacles to courtroom-based reparations, hicludilg the difficulty of provilg
dllty, causation. and damages: technical barriers such as limitations statutes
and lacies and constitutional problems such as standing and courts* strict
scruthiv of racial classifications. hi the political realin. the Clifficulty of iden-
tifying those who should pay and those who should receive reparations, and
the impact of a successful reparations scheme oil race relations in Anerica.
should counsel agailst the wisdom of reparations for slaver.
When grappling with providing reparations for slavery, two dis-
tinct categories of issues emerge: legal and political. While the divi-
sion between law and politics is murky at the margins, the distinctly
legal issues involved in slavery reparations focus on the doctrinal pos-
sibilities of obtaining damages for slavery, and the policy wisdom of
altering legal doctrine, if necessary, to afford such a remedy. Part I of
this Article will discuiss the legal limitations of seeking reparations for
slaver; recognizing that a felt sense of injustice, by itself, is not a
sutfficient foundation for restitution uider private law. Part II will dis-
ctuss the political l)roblems inherent in slavery reparations, problems
that raise broad qttestions of whether and how we should use the po-
litical system to provide either a massive redistribution of wealth to
those claiming entitlement to reparations for slavery, or some other
socio-political scheme to redress the present effects of slavery. Part II
of this Article will argue that ap)roaching reparations fiOrn a political
perspective would ultimately prove more problematic than cathartic.
Finally, at the very intersection of law and politics lies the constitut-
tional question of whether, or to what extent, such redistribution is
permissible. Part III of this Article will address why it is unlikely that
© 2004, Calhi Massey, Professor of Law, Universitv of California, Hastings College of
the Law. Visithig Professor of La.m Boston College Law School, 2003-2004. 1 appreciate the
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reparations for slavery will overcome the strict scrutiny of racial
classifications. This Article concludes that reparations for slavery face
numerous, and likely insurmountal)le, legal and political hurdles.
I. PRIVATE LAW
Professor Hylton divides tort claims for slavery reparations into
those seeking a conventional form ofjustice and those seeking to redis-
tribute wealth to improve overall social welfare. 1 Under the justice ap-
proach, specific victims must identify the particular individuals or enti-
ties that harmed them, the precise acts that led to their injur; and the
sum necessary to compensate their injuries. 2 The social welfare ap-
proach, however, "aims for a significant redistribution of wealth," rather
than achieving 'justice in any discrete case."3 According to Professor
Hylton, the social welfare approach "shares much in common with the
... tobacco litigation[, which] led to a large-scale redistribution [of
wealth] from cigarette manufacturers and their customers to other
groups in society [in order to] compensate society for some of the 'ex-
ternalities' imposed by the cigarette industry. " As Professor Hylton ac-
knowledges, there are significant differences between the social welfare
approach and the conventional justice approach. This Article will ex-
amine the social welfare method first, and then briefly discuss the con-
ventional justice method.
A. Social I14, fare
The social welfare approach to slavery reparations seeks to invoke
the tort system to accomplish massive wealth redistribution. AJthough
the tobacco litigation achieved this goal (albeit to a lesser degree than
that sought by reparations advocates), there are vast differences be-
tween the two cases. The social welfare approach to slavery repara-
tions faces some daunting hurdles. First, slavery, although unjust, was
legal. Second, an accounting of the effects of slavery, while informa-
tive, will not serve any real legal purpose. Third, the passage of time
raises problematic questions of (luty, causation, and damages.
I Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. T1IRD VORLD L.J. 31, 32-
33 (2004) [hereinafter Hylon, Framework].
2 Id.
3 Id. at 33.
Id. at 33-34.
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1. The Legality of Slavery
The formal legality of American slavery poses a substantial obstacle
to a tort claim for slavery reparations. Although slavery was a unique
institution, in that the state largely permitted slaveholders to wield ab-
solute power over slaves, this seeming absence of law did not make slav-
ery a comlpletely lawless practice. There were at least seven provisions of
the 1787 Constitution that recognized slavery as a part of the legal or-
der of the states. 5 However stirring Jefferson's statement of human
equality may be, it is familiar history that the drafters of our constitu-
tion wove slavery into our fundamental law flrom the beginnings of ottr
republic. Slavery was more than simply legal; it was a recognized, ftm-
damentally constitutional fact. Sobering and disqutieting though that
may be, it remains fact. It bears repeating that there was no formal ab-
sence of law governing the relationship between slave and master.
While it is true that most of the law concerning slaves cemented the
subjugation of slave to master, and that laws whose aim was to inhibit
the excessive abuse of slaves were largely ineffective, laws existed )ttr-
porting to govern the relationship between master and slave.6 As unsat-
isfving and unjust as these laws were, there was no legal void.
Even if one could persuasively argue that the master-slave rela-
tionship was a legal void, that would not vitiate its formal legality as a
defense to a contemporary tort claim. Consider a rough modern ana-
logtte, recognizing that there can be no true analogy to the horror of
slavery. Until fairly recently, family relationships were also largely ex-
empt firom legal inspection; the state ceded its vast power to parents
so that they could define the "law" governing their relationships with
their children. Even in the heyday of "Father Knows Best," law was not
totally absent from the family. WotulCl it be proper to conclude that,
because law was largely absent from the family, ant emotionally cold
and distant parent (bit one who did not intentionally inflict emo-
tional distress tipon his children) could not assert the lawfulness of his
parental disinterest as a defense to a tort claim made by his child?
5 SCeU.S. CONSr. art. I, § 2, c. 3 (three-fifths clause); art. I, § 8, c. 15 (militia clause);
art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (non-importation clause); art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (suspension of habeas corpus
clause); art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (fugitive clause); art. IV, § 4 (guarantee clause); art. V (prohibit-
ing amendment of non-importation clause prior to 1808).
6 Sccgencrally SLAVER" AND T ItAW (Paut Finkelman ed., 1996).
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2. Accounting for Slavery
There is a vast moral chasm between slavery and an emotionally
cold parent, and it is ultimately upon moral grounds that one must
considler slavery reparations. While the political system is tile better ve-
hicle for sorting out moral claims of entitlement, we must at least
evaluate the moral clains of the social welfare model in light of the ex-
isting architecture of tort law. The most attractive (albeit possibly inef-
fective) way in which to articulate those moral claims in tort doctrine is
through the seldom-used remedy of an accounting. An accounting-an
honest and complete accounting of the profits whipped from the backs
of black Anmericans held in slavery-is the "truth" part of an American
version of the South African exercise in "truth and reconciliation."
Entitlement to an accounting depends upon proving the exis-
tence of a tort, and the plroblems of duty and causation may prove to
be as insuperable here as they are with respect to tort claims seeking
damages.7 In more prosaic tort settings, one night wonder whether
there is any point to an accounting in the absence of any available
damages remedy. Such ant accounting would merely be a recitation of
lawful gains for which no one is entitled to compensation. For the
moment, however, let us ignore the real-world elephant of tort liability
and simply examine the accounting remedy in isolation. WVhen we ac-
knowledge that a nominally lawfil past practice was morally abomina-
ble and bereft of law in practice, even if there are no legally cogniza-
ble present victims or villains, the accounting remedy becomes far
more relevant as a practical way to compute, in utilitarian terms, the
cost of this morally repugnant past practice.
The principal value of an accounting for slavery lies not so much
in the legal realm but in the social and political world. Al accounting,
even if limited to the benefits obtained by specific defendants in a tort
action, would serve only to foctis public attention on the extent of the
wvealth amassed by whites from the labor of black slaves. 8 This, in it-
self, might have value. The number of Americans who truly under-
stand this point is astonishingly low. Some years ago, at a convention
of the Armnerican Society of Legal History held in Charleston, South
Carolina, I took a tour of old Charleston in the company of my fellow
academicians and a few outsiders. As we swept through fabulous man-
7See infra text accompanying notes 9-15.
8 See, e.g., RICHARI) F. AMERICA, PAYIN(; TILE SOCIAL DEBT: WIIAT \VIiITlE AMERICA
OWES BLACK AMERICA 6-8, 17-19 (1993); IRANDAtL, ROBINSON, THE DEB T: WIIAr AMERICA
OWES 'O BLACKS 206-07, 240-42 (2000).
[Vol. 24:157
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sion after fabulous mansion, one of our company (I hope not all aca-
demician) inquired innocently of our tour guide, a blue-blooded
Charlestonian, "Where did the money come from to build these
places?" Before our guile could answer, Professor Paul Finkelman,
who was standing next to me, blurted out, "From the backs of slaves!"
He was absolutely correct, but I still wonder how our tour guide would
have replied. Would she have said rice or indigo, leaving unspoken
who worked those fields? Or would she have recognized and identified
slavery as the brutally efficient form of wealth generation that it was in
the plantation economy of the old South? Al accounting, via the tort
system, would definitivelv answer that question, and answer it in the
form of legaljudgment, not merely in the form of an economist's opin-
ion, or an idealist's cri de coem:
Therein lie some additional problems. Why is it that a legal
judgment of anl accounting would have greater societal impact than
similar prolnouncements in the movies, on a PBS documentary; ol the
op-ed pages of the New York Times, or out of the mouth of a presiden-
tial candidate? A legal judgment would be the end-result of a process
that inevitably narrows focus, whether throtugh application of the
rules of evidence or by other aspects of legal process. Might such a
judgment, especially because it would be utterly empty of force, be
simply Shakespearean sound and firy, signifying nothing?
3. Passage of Time Problems
Ani even greater hurdle than the legal validity of slavery at the
time it existed is the passage of time problem. This manifests itself in
the form of insuperable proof problems with respect to duty, causa-
tion, and damages, to say nothing of the more technical issues of limi-
tations statutes and laches. Two types of tort claims might be brought
to recover damages for slavery, but each claim is initially dependent
on overcoming the hurdle of slavery's legal validity (iring its exis-
tence. The first such claim would seek damages for the wrongful re-
straint suffered by slaves; the second would seek restitution based on
unjust enrichment.
a. Damages for I1'rongfil Constraint
The problems with the first claim are duty, causation, and proof
of diamages. Duty raises the question of whether a contemporary de-
fendant owed and breached a duty to the contemporary plaintiff.
Consider two types of defendants, the individual descendant of
wealthy white slaveholders and the corporate enterprise, still existing,
2004]
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that derived profits from slavery in its corporate past. Let us assume
(probably unrealistically) that the blue-blooded Charleston tour guide
is the product of an absolutely pure genetic chain that, once followed
back to before 1865, consists exclusively of white slaveholding South
Carolinians who lived in those Charleston mansions. Let us firther
assume that our tour guide lives today in one of those mansions, an
inheritance that has passed continuously through her family, resting
for the moment in her. She would now be enjoying the fruit of a tree
planted and watered by the sweat wrung from the brow of the ances-
tor of her neighbor, a fellow citizen of Charleston (let tis imagine him
to be a Colonel in the United States Marine Corps). What dluty to the
Colonel does the tour guide owe that she has breached? No dou)t her
ancestor breached many duties owed by law and morality to the ances-
tor of the Colonel, but what principle of law imputes those foul
breaches to his fourth or fifth generation descendant? The principle
of corruption of blood is foreign to our institutions; do we really wish
to revive it, even if it were constitutionally permissible to do so?
Now consider duty in the context of the corporate defendant.
Corporations, as fictional and immortal persons, are surely liable for
their breaches of dhity that occurred prior to the end of slavery. This
leaves open the question of who can claim recovery for those breaches
of a corporation's duty. Imagine a corporate trafficker in humans dur-
ing the nineteenth century that is still in existence. Surely that corpora-
tion owed and breached a duny to the slave (assuming that slavery's
nominal legality is no defense); but did that corporation, by its long-ago
actions, violate a duty owed to a contemporary descendant of the slave?
If so, may I also recover from a hyvpothetical corporation that breached
its contract with my' ancestor by holding him in indentured servitude
for a year longer than stipuilated? WAhat duty does the corporation owe
me, as distinct from my ancestor? To put the question into yet another
context, may the descendant of a Titanic sinking victim recover from
the corporate successor to the White Star Line?
Another problematic consideration is causation, which invokes the
question of whether the injury presently complained of was a foresee-
able product of the defendant's conduct. It makes no difference to this
issue whether the defendant is the Charleston tour guide or the corpo-
rate slave trader. In either case, assuming you have concluded that it is
appropriate to attribute to the tour guide the sins of her ancestors, it is
necessary to wrestle with the issue of whether that past conduct has
[Vol. 24:157
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caused injury to a contemporary plaintiff.9 Satisfaction of this causal
link may occur through several measures. Compared to whites, blacks
in America remain poorer, facing shorter life expectancies, are less
educated, and face a greater likelihood of criminal victimization,
among other ills. 10 While these facts may constitute circumstantial evi-
dence of causation, another attempt to establish a causal link is the
claim that slavery embedded in American society the "resilient Nirus" of
racism, which tends "to replicate itself in successive generations. ' If
one starts from these propositions, the proximate cause claim becomes
an assertion that slavery caused racism and that racism is responsible
for the disadvantaged position of black Amnericans. Neither assertion is
incontestable; racism can and does exist where slavery never did, and
racism is surely jist one anong a number of contributors to this de-
plorable state of affairs. One need not subscribe to Professor
Mc\Vhorter's view of the ills of black America 2 to recognize that white
racism is not the sole and exclusive cause of the social ills that beset
black Americans. It is a plaulsible thesis that the well-meant culture of
the welfare state has been a significant contributor to the disadvantages
that beset many black Americans today.
13
9 It is essentially on this ground that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cirtcuit, in
Cato v. United States. concluded that Affrican-American plaintiffs who sought to recover
reparations from the United States for slavery lacked standihg to assert the claim. See 70
F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995).
10 See MELVIN L. OLIVER & TIiONAs NI. SitAPIRO, BLA(CK XVEALTII/HiiITE \iEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIA! INEQUALI'S 85-90, 109-11 (1995) (discussing wealth dis-
paiities and educational differences); STEiPHAN TiIERNSTROM & Aic,\IAi THIERNSTROM,
ANrIRIcA IN BLAC .K AND WITE 263-68 (1997) (discissing criminal victimization); Dorotlty
A. Brown et al., Social SecutY Reform: Risks. Returns, and Race, 9 (ORNELLJ. L. & PuR. POL'Y
633, 637 (2000) (discussing shorter life expectancies).
It See KEITH N. HY ITON, SLAVERY AN) TOiT tLAw 32 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Work-
ing Paper No. 03-02, 2003, Soc. Science Research Network Elec. Paper Collection) [here-
inafter Hx iON, SLAVERY ANt ToRTr], at http:/ww.t.edu/law/facuht/papers/HyhonK
012803abstract.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
12 See generall tJOiiN H. MNIU\WHORTER, LOSING -tit RAcE: SELF-SABOTAc.E IN BLACK
AmtFRICa (2000) (discussing three manifestations of the "ideological sea of trottbles plagu-
ing black ,America": the Ctilt of Victinlologv, Separatism, and luti-iitellectualism).
11 Consider the following: In 1995 the median income of black two-parent families was
88% that of white two-parent families, but the median income of all black families i,-as only
61% of all white fansilies. Id. at 10. The disparity is attributable to the low income of many
black sihgle mothers. Id. McNVhorter also notes that a majority of blacks (56%) live in the
South, a region notorious for wages lower than the rest of the country, and that the rate of
tcrease h median pay was faster anmong blacks than whites in the 1990s. Id. In mid-twentieth
century America more than two-thirds of all black children were born hito a two-parent fanm-
ls; bv the end of the century more than two-thirds of all black children were born into a
silgle mother famils, a statistic leadilg one pair of researchers to conclude that this family
structure is what divides poor blacks from middle-class or well-to-do blacks. THERNSTROM &
20041
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Whatever the general social causation that may be at work, it is a
mutch harder proposition to defend the causal linkage between the
present injuries of an), particular plaintiff (or even the class of all pre-
sent descendants of Aimerican slaves) and the past specific tort of
wrongful constraint attributed to today's defendants. Consider ant
analogous problem. In the unitary school desegregation cases, such as
Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court exhibited a willingness to sever the
causal link between past unconstitutional cle jure racial discrimination
and the cle facto racial disparity that exists in the present pupil com-
position of schools formally governed by de jure racial discrimina-
tion.14 If that causal link is so easy to sever, what is the likelihood that
courts dealing with a tort claim for slavery reparations will find slavery
to be a proximate cause of today's racial disparities in wealth?
Finally, even if duty and causation do not pose insurmountable
hurdles, one must wonder about the spectilative nature of the dam-
ages. It is a familiar principle to litigators that claims for lost profits
will fail unless there is specific proof of the opportunities inl hand lost
as a result of someone's tortiotis conduct. That principle is applicable
here. Calculation of the economic loss suffered by any given present-
day descendant of an Amuierican slave attributable to the wrongful
confinement of slaves is so speculative as to be ant exercise in imagina-
tion. Perhaps that is why reparationists' estimates of the total such loss
are so wildly disparate. 15 We have no way of determining the precise
cost of the labor value or of the emotional costs extracted from slaves.
Even more difficult is knowing how mutch of that sum would have
been passed on to the next generation, and how much of that value
would survive transmission through four or five succeeding genera-
tions. It is safe to generalize that blacks in America would be better off
economically today if the ftull value of slave labor and the emotional
costs of slavery had been distributed to newly emancipated slaves in
1865, but it is impossible to know how much better off today's black
Anericans would be, if at all. It is even more speculative to try pin-
ning a number on the loss suffered by any given contemporary indi-
TIIERNST[RONI, supro note 10, at 237, 239-41. It is a matter of debate what caused this latnen-
table phenomenon; one suspect is the incentive afforded by federal welfare measures, insti-
tuted in the 1960s, for mothers to raise their children without the benefit of marriage.
14 See 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992).
15 See, e.g., Robert AV. Tracinski, America's "Field of the Blackbirds": How the Campaign for
Reparations for Slavery Perpetuates Racism, 3J.L. Soc'y 145, 157 (2002) (describing estimates
ranging from $1.4 trillion to $24 trillion).
[Vol. 24:157
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vidual descendant of American slavery. Il short, this loss, like the
blisiness plaintiff's claim for lost profits, is not legally cognizable.
b. Restitn lion for Uhnjust Euichtcu
The second claim, restitution, fares little better. Indeed, if restitu-
tion is merely a tort remedy there is nothing to add to my earlier
comments on dhity and causation. If restitution is, in this context, a
separate cause of action, there remain two major obstacles to its ap-
plication to a claim for reparations.
First, as discussed in connection with the claim for wrongful
confinement, the present value of the profits derived from slavery by
any given contemlporary defendant is virtually impossible to calculate.
It can only be guesswork. Few corporate defendants will have records
adequate to prove such profits, and no individual will have such re-
cords. For example, how would you establish the present value of the
profits derived from slavery by any given white descendant of Thomas
Jefferson?
Second, even if one is able to surniOult the obstacle of adequate
proof of the amount of these specutlative profits, there remains the
task of establishing that restitution from a contemporary proxy for an
alite-belluim profiteer from slavery will actually further restitution's
objectives-deterring "market bypassing andi unamliguously-socially-
unudesirable condtict '' 16 and ensuring public peace by discouraging
extra-legal retaliation. No doubt, such all award would deter ally pre-
sent-day person fiom engaging in slavery, but that is not a real prob-
lem in twenty-first century Anerica. It is far more plautsible to argue
that restitution ensures public peace by assuaging the hurt and anger
felt by many black Americans. Nevertheless, a felt sense of injustice, by
itself, is not a sufficient foundation for restitution. The classic case for
restittition in tort, as a separate cause of action, is to punish a bad ac-
tor (and deter him from flurther misconduct) by delivering his ill-
gotten gains to his victim. W\ith reparations there are only proxies for
long-dead bad actors, there will be no deterrence, and wholly specutla-
tive gains will be delivered to people who are, at worst, proxies for
long-dead victims and, at best, people who stiffer in varying degrees
from the remote vestiges of slavery.
I am not contending that racism is dead (it sutrelv is not; racism is a
far harder disease to extirpate than smallpox). Neither am I arguing
16 Scc H-'tiON, Si.,\'ER" ANi) TORT1, bltra( note 11, at 43.
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that there is no connection betveen slavery and racism (of course there
is). I am contending only that the nexus between slavery and tle pres-
ent forces that produce the sense of injustice felt by black Americans
today is too attenuated to merit a judicial award of damages based on
restitution. Like the causation element of standing in constitutional law,
the injury must be "fairly traceable" to slavery through a chain that con-
tains no links of independent causation. In short, tort lawsuits for repa-
rations will vin publicity but little if any damages.
B. ConventionalJustice
The exception to this assessment is the category of reparations
suits that seeks conventional justice. A prototypical such case is the
suit filed by Professor Ogletree, among others, seeking damages for
the Tulsa race riot. 17 First, as Professor Brophy has painstakingly
documented in his book on the Tulsa riot, Reconstructing the Dream-
land,is there is no doubt whatever that the riot was an act of official
violence, patently illegal at the time it was committed. Second, the
governmental entities that committed those unlawful acts exist today.
Third, there are presently existing people who were the direct and
immediate victims of this official violence.
19
These facts combine to distinguish claims for damages attributable
to the Tulsa riot from claims for damages attributable to slavery. Unlike
Tulsa, claims for damages (lue to slavery seek recovery for acts lawful at
tie time committed, often asserted against entities that did not commit
those acts, and by people who were not themselves tle injured part.
These are not formalities; these differences reflect the fact that our le-
gal culture is one of individual rights and responsibilities. Indeed, a
fumclamental organizing principle of our legal system is that rights and
responsibilities are individual matters. Some sneer at the supposed
fiction of the individual rights-bearer, and many advocates of repara-
tions enthusiastically embrace the notion of collective rights and collec-
tive liability, but tiey have the burden of proving why it is that we
should displace our fundamental notions of individual rights and re-
sponsibilities with a collectivist version of rights and responsibilities.
17 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Alexander v. Governor of Oklahoma (N.D. Okla. filed Feb.
28, 2003) (No. 03-CV-1 33).
18 See AiFRED L. BROPIIX, RECONSTRUCTING TIHE DREAMt.AN: Ttli Tul-SA RiOm oF
1921 (2002).
19 CharlesJ. Ogletree, Tulsa Reparations: The Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. TmR W\ORDm L.J.
13, 18 (2004) (stating there are over 120 survivors of the riot still living).
[Vol. 24:157
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The collectivist notion of rights and obligations is curiously atavis-
tic, rooted in the same impulse that created the theological fiction of
original sin. Human freedom means having the freedom to make
choices and to accept the consequences that result from those choices.
The quintessentially American version of this idea is that you should be
free to shape yourself.
Individutality does not come without risk. Consider why it is that
Amnerican literature teachers still assign the only good novel Scott
Fitzgerald ever wrote, in which Jay Gatsby sprang from his own Pla-
tonic conception of himself and turned ouit to be (lark, troubled, and
criminally tragic. Fitzgerald concluded that "we beat on, boats against
the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past."20 Here, brilliantly
captured in metaphor, is the essential dilemma of tie reparations de-
bate: We beat on in our individuial cockleshells, armed with our rights
and responsible for our own actions alone, but we beat against the
current of our past racial injustice and are borne back ceaselessly into
that past. If we are to best that current, we nmst confront it, then tame
it, in order to glide with tranquility to some happy land beyond. Rec-
onciling ourselves with the past so that we may valiantly face the fit-
ture is the domain of politics, not law.
II. POLITICS
Tort law will probal)ly not provide redress to those who seek repa-
rations for slaver; but the political realm may prove to be a more ade-
quate foruni. What is the strength of the case for using the political sys-
tem to effect a massive redistribution of wealth fiom white Americans
to black Americans? This redistribution might take the form of direct
cash transfers or indirect transfers in the form of social welfare benefits
or subsidies that are distinctly race-based. 21 For the sake of simplicity, I
will lump these together as monetary reparations. There are a host of
problems with monetary reparations, but most can be grouped into
one of two broad categories: pragmatic problems and consequential
problems. Because this topic is so vast and my space and time are so
limited, I content myself with the academician's primary job-asking
questions.
20 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, Timr (REAT GATSB 189 (Scribner Books 1992) (1925).
21 But see David Lyons, Reparations and Equal Opportunity. 24 B.C. TIRD WORLD t..J. 177
(2004) (discussing a series of race-neuitral social welfare programs that could take the
place of reparations specifically targetd to blacks).
2004]
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A. Pragmatic Problems
Who should benefit from reparations? Should all blacks benefit,
including immigrants not descended from slaves? Should this class of
beneficiaries also include descendents of Native-American slaves?
What sort of proof would one need to establish eligibility if only the
descendants of slaves are eligible for reparations? If all blacks are eli-
gible, what determines who is black? It would be ironic if in imple-
menting a race-based form of reparations it would be necessary to
employ a rule of law defining race; such legal definitions would emu-
late the legal regimes of the Jim Crow South and Nazi Germany.
Should benefits be equal among all recipients? Should Oprah
Winfrey, Johnnie Cochran, Richard Parsons, or Denzel WVashington,
to name just a few spectacularly successful black Americans, receive
the same amount as a minister, a postal clerk, an army sergeant, a
manual laborer, or an unemployed single mother?
Should causation have any role to play? Should beneficiaries be
required to prove some causal link between slavery and their individ-
utal current condition? Should there be any relevance to the fact that
the economic condition of most American blacks is far better than
that of African blacks?
22
Who should pay? Should funds come from all non-blacks, includ-
ing Latinos, Asians, Indians, and those whose ancestors immigrated to
America after the end of slavery? Should funds come only from white
nericans, or, perhaps, only the descendants of slave owners? If so,
how do we determine the identity of these people? What degree of ge-
netic connection would be enough to hold a person liable? Consider
again the morality and wisdom of using law to identify the requisite de-
gree of genetic taint in order to establish stigma and liability. Into what
category should we place a person who is descended from both Tho-
masJefferson and Sally Hemings? Into what category should we place a
person who has one grandparent of Chinese ancestr; another of Irish
ancestry, a third who is indigenous to the Peruvian highlands, and the
fourth who was a Russian immigrant? Should it matter if the Irish an-
cestor was a slaveholder? WhIiat if the Irish slaveholder came to America
as an indentured servant? These are not fanciful questions; they de-
serve serious answers if any reparations scheme is to blossom.
22 See DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSV OVER REPARATIONS FOR
SLAVERY 12 (2002).
[Vol. 24:157
HeinOnline  -- 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 168 2004
The Law and Politics of Reparations
B. Consequential Problems
The single largest consequential problem with reparations stems
directly from taking seriously the arguments of such reparations advo-
cates as Professor Richard America and Randall Robinson. Repara-
tions are intended to pay The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks, to
qutote the title of Robinson's book on the sulbject. 23 Similarly, Profes-
sor America titles his book, Paying the Social Debt: IWhat lVlqite America
Owes Black America. 24 This raises the following practical conundrum: If
non-black America pays "The Debt" by cash or other transfers of pres-
ent wealth, what is the justification for the continued use of race-
based affirmative action? One such justification is that cash repara-
tions, like damages, pay for past wrongs and racial preferences act as
injunctive relief to prevent fiuture wrongs. This is a plausil)le
justification, )ut it is both politically impracticale and laden with ex-
traordinary potential for racial division and animosity. Affirmative ac-
tion in the wake of a broad reparations scheme would be politically
impracticable iecause non-black America is unlikely to accept the
premise that it must pay twice for a single wrong. It will inflame racial
divisions if cash reparations are made on the premise that they extin-
guish "The Debt," bit non-black America learns afterwards that it was
only a down payment, with a continued obligation to provide race-
based preferences. One need not be clairvoyant to predict that a great
tstinami of anger and racial division will ensue. Advocates of repara-
tions need to confront the political consequences of success.
The second consequiential l)rol)len is embedded in the first l)rol)-
lem. If thirty years of race-based affirmative action has produced many
benefits, it has also generated widespread unpopularity, and that un-
l)opularity is not limited to those who receive no benefits from
affirmative action. Whatever the scope and value of its benefits,
affirmative action has, to quote Professor Schtick, "created new barriers
to inter-racial reconciliation and heightened the salience and divisive-
ness of race-precisely the opposite of the advocates' originally [sic]
goals."25 If that has been the effect of affirmative action, what will lie
the effect of a massive race-ased wealth redistribution effected
through political coercion? Consider also the consequences to the p0-
23 Scc ROBINSON, S1tpra note 8.
21 See AmEFRICA, supra note 8.
25 Peter H. Schiick, Slavery Rcparations: A Aisguided Movemen0t, at http:!/jUrist.law.pitt
.etu/foi rn/fort mnew78.1php (Dec. 9, 2002). For a thorough assessment of the effects of
affirmative action, see Peter H. Schtick, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future 20 "1A E
L. & i'oLi' REV. 1 (2002).
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litical process of adopting any governmental system of race- or ethnic-
based wealth transfers.2 6 Once such a system is established, or even
once tile idea is established that overtly race-based wealth transfers are
possible and legitimate, people will organize along racial lines to obtain
the transfers.
There is nothing unique to race about this phenomenon, which
economists call rent seeking. Economists also note that narrowly con-
centrated interest groups are more effective in the social competition
for rents than larger and more diffuse groups, which explains why the
media moguls prevail over the interests of individual consumers when
it comes to the manufacture of copyright laV.27 Thus, once govern-
ments start making race-based transfer payments, there are strong in-
centives to establish an identity within the benefited racial
classification. We can observe this l)henomenon at work in the tribal
identities of enrolled tribes that operate lucrative casinos under the
Indian Gaining Regulatory Act. Presently enrolled tribal members
have an incentive to exclude in-enrolled people who have a plausible
connection to the tribe, and those outsiders clamor to become part of
the tribe. 28 Race-based wealth transfers raise the very real specter of
governments creating incentives for honing all exquisite sense of ra-
cial consciousness and encouraging elaborate and divisive mecha-
nisms for determining racial identities. One must wonder whether
that is the vision of pluralism and diversity to which we aspire. One
must also wonder whether, given our past errors, we wish to continue
postponing separation of race and state.
The third consequential problem of reparations is that tley
would divert attention from other possible approaches to the various
social pathologies that afflict our nation. So far, we have been doing
something right with regard to race, regardless of the distance that we
may yet have to travel. Since 1940, the median income of black males
. Mv comments on this point are inspired by Jennifer Roback, The Separation of Race
and State. 14 H.NRV.J.L. & PUB. POL'X 58 (1991).
27 See Dennis S. Karjala, Opposing Copyight Extension, it http://wwlaw.as.edn/Home
Pages/Kl-jala/OpposingCopyrightExtensioii (last visited Oct. 20, 2003). This website is
niaintahied by Arizona State University law professor Dennis Kaijala and contains ntimer-
otis links to articles ant congressional testinony contending that copyright extension,
particularly via the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in various sections of 17 U.S.C.), favored copyright owners at
the expense of consuners. Id. See generally'J ss cA LitSAN, DtIG rTL CxOPYRIGHT (2001).
28 See Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Playing the Political Slots, TirE, Dec. 23,
2002, at 53; Donald L. Bartlett &James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TtIE, Dec. 16, 2002,
at 47, 57.
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has risen from 41% of that of while males to 67%; the median income
of black females has risen from 36% of that of white females to 87%.29
In 1995, the median income of black two-parent families was 88% of
the median income of white two-parent families, and even that dispar-
ity is partially explained by the fact that 56% of those black families
lived in tie South, the region with the lowest wages in Almerica. 30 The
percentage of black households living below the government's "pov-
erty line" has declined from 48% in 1959 to 22% in 1999. 31 Since 1940
the pmroportion of black males holding middle-class occupations has
risen over six times; the proportion of black females holding such jobs
has risen over nine times. 32 It is trute that these numbers hardly sug-
gest equality-only 32% of black males and 60% of black females held
"middle-class"jobs as of 1990.33 Poverty is still a fixture of too much of
black Amuerica-some 22% of black Americans live in povert)y Rea-
sonable people may differ as to the causes of the disl)arity. Repara-
tions advocates say that this is the legacy of slavery. Perhaps they are
right, but there is room for various interpretations. Stephen and Abi-
gail Theristrom, in their book America in Black and IWhite, conclude
that "it is family stru cture that largely divides the haves firom the have-
nots in tie black community. The )ol)tlationl in )overty is made tip
overwhelmingly of single nothers. "3
Slavery can hardly be the cause of the increase of single mother
households in the black community. In mid-twentieth century Amer-
ica, more than two-thirds of black children were born into two parent
families; at the end of the centtury more than two-thirds of black chil-
dren were born into single-mother families. 35 This is not the forum to
debate why this hal)pened, but it is not credible to assert that this
twentieth century single-mother lphenomenon is the immediate (or
even the plausibly remote) restilt of slavery. It is a contemporary fail-
tire. Pouring the monetary salve of reparations into this social wound
will hel l) somewhat, but is it the best cure?
If debate abott rel)arations is to be serious, there must be con-
sideration of alternative al)lroaches to the structtural l)robleln of ine-
qualities of wealth. This is not the forun in which to propose or ex-
29 See NICAV11ORTER, stipra note 12, at 9-10.
30 Id. at 10.
31 Hviton, Framework supra note 1. at 34 tbl.1.
32 TIHERNSTROM & TilERNSTROM, slipra note 10, at 185 tbl..
33 Sce id.
31 Id. at 237.
35 Id. at 239-40.
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amine such alternatives in detail, htt one can readily imagine a range
of expensive social welfare initiatives that could be delivered on a
race-neutral basis while still producing a meaningful impact on the
problem of structural wealth inequality.
36
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The constitutional problems associated with reparations depend
on the nature of the reparations. Given the limited time and space at
my disposal, these comments are mere cursory observations.
Racial classifications, whether malignant or benign, are pre-
stimed to violate the Equal Protection guarantee, and may only be
upheld if the government can prove that the classification is necessary
(or narrowly tailored) to accomplish a compelling government objec-
tive.37 Race-based reparations are thus subject to strict scrutiny: While
strict scrutiny of race-based reparations might not prove fatal, a ra-
cially neutral reparations scheme would be presumptively valid and
subject only to minimal scrutiny. This would virtually assure its validity,
but how can reparations for slavery be racially neutral?
If the beneficiaries of reparations are limited to those who are
descended from slaves, it is possible that the relevant classification
would not be race-based. Such a classification would be similar to the
Supreme Court's classification, in Geduldig v. Aiello, of pregnant peo-
ple and non-pregnant people as not based on sex.38 Nevertheless, a
similar reparations scheme is unlikely to work, if only )ecause of the
difficulty of proving that one is descended from slaves. Self-serving
declarations based on oral history will not do. Ultimately, some form
of presumption would be necessary, and that presutmnption would in-
evitably be race-based.
Even if reparations were not based on race, reparations would be
susceptible to an attack that they were motivated by race. Thus, under
the principle of W1ashinglon v. Davis, reparations would be subject to
strict scrutiny tuiless the government could prove that it would have
enacted its reparations program for non-racial reasons, a rebuttal that
would be extremely difficult to prove.3 9 Because monetary reparations
36 See generally Lyons, supra note 21.
37 See Adarand Constrctors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995); City of Richmond
v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
38 See417 U.S. 484, 494-97 (1974).
39 See426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976).
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are likely to require a racial classification, however, strict scrutiny will
apply to any Equal Protection challenge of the program.
40
The first prol)lem for those who might wish to challenge such
reparations, however, is standing. The key problem is establishing per-
sonal injury in fact. So-called "taxpayer" standing may not suffice. After
Vlhley Foige Chistian College v. Amnericans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., the scope of taxpayer standing has been, in effect, restricted
to the precise facts of Flast v. Cohe-governental expenditures that
allegedly violate the Establishment Clause.4 1 Yet I'lley Foige did not
overrule Flast, and it may be possible for a federal taxpayer to claim
successfully that his taxpayer status enables him to challenge govern-
mental expenditures that are openly race-based as a violation of Equal
Protection. If taxpayer status is insufficient to confer standing, however,
it is difficult to conceive of a likely plaintiff wid standing. The fact that
a government expenditutre based on race alone is a presumptive \iola-
tion of Equal Protection does not enable any American to assert its in-
validity, for such a plaintiffs claim is a mere generalized grievance, one
shared by everyone and withotit particularized injury ill fact. 42 Consider
the injury that supported standing of the plaintiff in Jacobs v. Bart, 43 in
which the plaintiff challenged the constitutional validity of reparation
payments to victims of the World lVar II Japanese internment camps.
"Arthur Jacobs, an ,American citizen who says lie was detained with his
German father in 1945, argues [that because] the Act compensates ill-
40 The constitutional validitv of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1989b-1989b9 (2000), which provided a $20,000 payment to each person of Japanese
ancestry who was deprived of liberty or property as a result of the forcible relocation and
confinement of American citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry during
\VorId NVar II, was upheld il Jacobs v. Bar, 959 F.2d 313. 314-15, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In
Jacobs, a pre-Adarand opinion, the U.S. Coinrt of Appeals for the D.C. Citcuit invoked Metro
Broadcasting. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and applied intermediate scruitiny, but
opiied in dicta that the Act wotild sttrvive strict scrtitin. Jacobs. 959 F.2d at 318. The court
suggested that the Act wotild survive strict scrutiny because the government's purpose-to
edress an act of racial rliscriitiation that, although declared valid at the time ill Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). has since been widely repudiated as unjust, tll)-
consitiutional, and based on government misconduct in the coinls-was compelling and
the cash reparations were a narrowly tailored was to provide some restitution to the imme-
diate and drect victims of the Japanese excltsion order. SecJacobs, 959 F.2d at 321.
For more oil the government misconduct, which consisted of deliberate lies to the
Stipreme Cottrt, see Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417-18 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
I'ETER IRONS, JusTICr AT \\AR (1983).
41 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. AMls. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488-90 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1968).
12 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Conm. to Stop the lVar, 418 U.S. 208, 216-17
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-75 (1974).
43 959 F.2d at 313.
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terns of Japanese and Meutian, but not German, descent ... it denies
him the equal protection of the laws." 44 By Ihis principle, reparations
for slavery limited to Amnericans of African ancestry might be cial-
lenged by someone whose ancestors were American Indians held in
slaver)y or perhaps even by someone whose ancestor was an English-
man bound to indentttred servitude.
On the merits, the government would contend that its compel-
ling purpose is remedial: to proide some measure of restitution for
the moral abomination of slavery and to assuage its present effects.
There are several problems with this purpose. First, although morally
obnoxious, slavery was not a constitutional wrong. In Jacobs, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dealt with this contention in
connection with reparations to Japanese-.Anerican internees by not-
ing that a congressional commission
found unambiguously that Executive Order No. 9066 [author-
izing the internments] and the military orders affectingJapa-
nese Americans were the products of prejudice and dema-
goguery, rather than military necessity.... Congress noted
that the premises relied on in Supreme Court decisions up-
holding the internment have been repudiated by scholars, by
former government officials, and more recently, by cotirts.
45
The second problem with the government's stated purpose of as-
suaging the present effects of slavery is that the objective becomes one
of seeking to remedy broad societal effects of unconstittutional racism, a
putrpose that the Court has hinted may be insufficiently compelling to
4 Id. at 314.
45 1(. at 315. For this proposition the Coturt of Appeals cited H.R. Rep. No. 278, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987) and stated:
In 1983, Fred Korematsn, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Nin1orui '.sni, %ho had
challenged the constitutionality of the internment, reopened their landmark
federal cases through writs of error coram nobis. Their wartime convictions for
defying the internment policy were vacated, based on evidence that the gov-
eriment had misrepresented and Suplpressed evidence that racial prejuidice,
not military necessity, motivated the internment of Japanese Amtericans. Ko-
rensiatsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (\\V.D. WAash. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Nasui v. United States, 83-151 BE (D. Or.
1984), remanded, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985). None of the decisions was
reversed on appeal. For an admirable review of the history of the internment
policy, see Hohri v. United States, .... 782 F.2d 227, 231-39 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(\\¥ightJ.), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 ... (1987).
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surmount strict scrutiny. 4 6 As Justice Scalia has put it more colorfully,
"inder our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor
or a delbtor race.47
Even if the Court accepted that atoning for the costs of societal
racism is a compelling objective, there remains the problem of prov-
ing that reparations are narrowly tailored to accomplishing its stated
objective. A host of non-racially based initiatives would perhaps be
better suited to addressing the differential wealth effects that repara-
tions advocates atribulte to slavery and racism. 48 Without proof of tile
inability of such programs to accomplish tile objective of remedying
the present effects of race-based slavery, a race-based reparations pro-
grant would almost surely founder on the rock of narrow tailoring.
The funding device for reparations may present additional prob-
lenis. If a special tax were levied only on the descendants of slave-
holders, it would be susceptible to attack as a bill of attainder. If
specific property were seized as tile fiuits of slave labor, such seizures
would be susceptible to attack as an uncom)ensated taking. Moreover,
because of the extreme difficulty of proving who is descended from
slaveholders, some sort of racial presumption woulld likely be neces-
sary to administer such a special tax. If that were the case, strict scru-
tiny would apply and the mirror image of the problems just liscussed
would emerge. If, however, reparations were funded by all Americans
out of general revenues, there would be no pectuliar constitutional
4, See. e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). The Court
states:
While there is no doubt that tihe sorry history of both private and public dis-
crimilation ill this cotntry has contributed to a lack of opporttinities for
black entrepreneurs, tlifs observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid
racial quota in the awarding of public contracts in Richmond .... [A]n
amorlphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular in-
dustry cannot justif thle use of an tunvielditig racial quota.
Id. Left unclear in this enigmatic passage is whether the defect is a poor fit of remedy to
objective ("an unyielding racial quota-) or whether it is the overly broad remedial purpose
("ani amorphous claim [of] past discrimtnation ). Justice Scalia is more direct: "The be-
nign tpurpose of compensating for social disadvantages, whether they have been acquired
by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise, can [not] be purstted by the illegitimate
means of racial discrimination ...." Id. at 520 (Scalia,J., concurring).
17 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgnenm) ("[G]overnment can never have a 'compelling
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make tp for past racial dis-
crimination in the opposite direction.").
48 See. e.g., Lyons, supra note 21, at 183-185.
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difficulties with fumding, although the Equal Protection problems
vith the expenditures would remain.
This is no more than a brief glance at the constitutional difficulties
of a reparations program. Under existing doctrine, an explicitly race-
based program of reparations is quite possibly unconstittutional. This is
not to say that the existing doctrine is iucapable of change; it may well
be the case that a reparations program could be the occasion for
change. Such change, however, seems unlikely vith the current Court.
CONCLUSION
I am a skeptic about the practical prospects of reparations. Repa-
rations to people who have suffered personal injury by tortfeasors, as
is sought in the case of the Tula race riot, should succeed, though
there are substantial obstacles to such claims in the form of limita-
tions statutes and sovereign imunt,1ity.49 Reparations for the general-
ized and diffuse injuries that are attributable, in some measure, to
two-and-a-half centuries of slavery and another hundred years of ra-
cial apartheid, are even less probable. Advocates for such reparations
seem much like Dorothy and her companions, facing a very arduous
struggle with many huge obstacles, and with no assurance that once
they have made it onto the yellow brick road and entered the fabled
City of Oz, they will find that there is anything of value behind the
green curtain. Yet I have always been a pessimist, and have long sub-
scribed to the faux Biblical proverb: "Blessed is he that expecteth
nothing, for he shall not be disappointed."
49 See generally BROpIuv, supra note 18.
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